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The United States and
International Cooperation to
Unify Private Law
RICHARD D. KEARNEY*
This is an appropriate time to have a review of United States par-
ticipation in the unification of private law. It was seven years ago
that the first meeting of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on
Private International Law took place. To pinpoint the occasion, it was
March 9, 1964.
Seven is a number with a certain cabalistic connotation. Quite
apart from its overriding importance to devotees of dice, there are the
seven heavens of Mohammedanism, the seven deadly sins, the seven
liberal arts, the seven champions of Christendom, and others too
numerous to mention. Seven years, however, always reminds me of
the periods in the Book of Genesis,' the seven fat years and the seven
lean years.
From that viewpoint we might consider whether the first seven years
of United States participation in the field of private international law
have been fat years or thin years. The question, of course, has to be
viewed in context, and the context contains a number of factors that
would indicate a greater likelihood of famine than of feast. For ex-
ample, at that first Advisory Committee meeting we were exclusively
occupied with the preparation of the United States positions for par-
ticipation in a conference on the international sale of goods that was
to open at The Hague on April 2, 1964.
*Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International
Law. This article is the text of an address given at a regional meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of International Law at Cornell Law School on March 18, 1971.
1. Genesis 41:29-80.
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The major document for consideration at that conference, the Draft
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, had been in
a rather spasmodic process of formulation for thirty-three years.
The first draft had appeared in 1935. There had been a 1951
conference to consider one of the revisions of the draft law at which
it was decided to set up a special commission to produce a new draft.
The commission produced a series of drafts, the last one appearing in
1963.
All of this work had gone on under the aegis of the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Rome Institute) without
any participation by the United States. We maintained an isolationist
position in the field of private international law long after we had
abandoned this ostrich posture in the public law area. For example,
as late as 1958 the United States delegation to the United Nations
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, because of the
traditional concern regarding federal-state relations, was under in-
structions not to participate actively in formulating a convention for
the recognition of foreign arbitral awards. After the conference adopted
such a convention, the delegation recommended against our ad-
herence thereto on the ground, among others, that the United States
lacked a sufficient domestic legal basis for acceptance of an advanced
international convention on the subject of arbitration.2 This always
struck me as making us out even more backward than we were.
Fortunately the legal profession was not as backward as the bureau-
cracy. The American Bar Association, 3 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the American Law Institute,
and other legal organizations urged the government to abandon the
nineteenth century concept that our federal system required us to
stand aloof from international efforts to unify private law. As a con-
sequence of this private initiative4 Congress enacted legislation author-
izing our entry into the two major international organizations then
concerned with private international law, the Rome Institute and the
Hague Conference on Private International Law.5 The legislation was
signed by the President on December 30, 1963, which is why at this
2. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 22 (1958) (unpublished ma-
terials on file at the Dep't of State).
3. The REPORT OF THE A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL UNIFIcA-
lION OF PRIVATE LAw (1961) played an important role in crystallizing support by the
legal profession for official United States participation in unification of private law.
86 A.B.A. REP. 219 (1961).
4. See Hearings on H. J. Res. 732 Before the Subcomm. on International Organiza-
tions and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.(1963).
5. 22 U.S.C. § 269g (1970).
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first meeting in March seven years ago we were trying to work out
in thirty days positions regarding a draft convention which had been
solidifying for a period of thirty years. A major complication was that,
in our view, the draft uniform law contained a good many flaws and a
number of major weaknesses. Among the latter were that the draft law
was directed primarily at problems arising in intra-European trade
and not to sales problems arising in transoceanic trade.
We were unable to achieve any sweeping changes in the uniform law
at the conference. As one possible consequence, seven years later the
proposed law remains in the draft stage and in the process of yet an-
other revision.6 Allan Farnsworth is going to discuss this process at
our afternoon session and I am happy to leave the topic to one of the
outstanding experts in the field. My major purpose in referring to the
subject was to illustrate that our progress in the field of international
unification must be measured in light of the fact that in some areas we
are new boys who have moved into a rather old and in many ways
close-knit neighborhood. We have a variety of problems that are
of greater concern to us than to the older inhabitants, and their ap-
proach to solving problems often differs from ours.
There is one additional element that I would like to introduce into
our context for determining whether our unification activities in the
last seven years could be called prosperous. The process of international
legislation is a cumbersome and time-consuming one. Even after gen-
eral agreement is reached on a text, bringing it into force is a slow and
frustrating process.1 Nowhere is this more true than with respect to
private law matters. While codification of public international law often
moves with less than all deliberate speed-the tventy-one year gestation
period of the Convention on the Law of Treaties is a substantial ex-
ample-there are occasions when action is taken and treaties become ef-
fective in a surprisingly short time.8 The nuclear test ban treaty is a
notable example.
Such celerity is a great rarity in the private law field, which makes
the results of our second venture into the area all the more interesting.
Nineteen sixty-four seemed at the time to our Advisory Committee a
slightly ill-starred year in which to begin operations because we im-
6. For the current status of this work, see U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L., Report,
26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, at 35-36, U.N. Doc. A/8417 (1971).
7. Ago, The Final Stage of the Codification of International Law, [1968] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. CO0M1'N 172-73, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/Rev. 1 (1968). For an informative sta-
tistical presentation see UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND REsEARCH,
WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES 31-36 (UNITAR Series No. 2, 1969).
8. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft entered
into force in less than ten months. [1971] T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
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mediately encountered the sales conference, which was shortly fol-
lowed by the quadrennial meeting of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.9
The Hague Conference concerns itself with conflict of laws and pro-
cedural problems that arise in the course of transnational transactions,
while the Rome Institute, or UNIDROIT, attempts to unify substan-
tive law on an international basis as is illustrated by the uniform law
of the international sale of goods.
Three draft conventions were under active consideration at The
Hague in October 1964. Again, we were under the disadvantage of not
having participated in the preliminary work on these drafts. Neverthe-
less, with respect to one item, our timing was superb. One of the draft
conventions was a proposal to amend part one of the 1954 Convention
on Civil Procedure. This part one was a narrow set of provisions for
transmission of judicial documents abroad through diplomatic or
consular channels.
On October 3, 1964, the President signed Public Law 88-61910 which
empowers the United States District Courts to order service of foreign
judicial documents and authorizes the State Department to serve as
the channel for transmission of requests for judicial assistance. The re-
vision of part one of the civil procedure convention which was to
be considered at the 1964 session had as its core element the establish-
ment of a Central Authority which would serve or have served judicial
documents received from abroad. Public Law 88-619 was, however, in
a number of respects more liberal in providing judicial assistance than
the draft convention, which put the U.S. delegation in the pleasant
position of being able to accept the proposed procedure and to con-
centrate on eliminating restrictions on its use. These efforts were
reasonably successful and the convention, as adopted by the conference,
is, as the President said in submitting it to the Senate for advice and
consent, "a notable step in the field of international judicial cooper-
ation.""
There are two features that are worthy of remark in this Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters.12
The first is that, in the absence of objection by the State of destin-
ation, freedom of using channels of transmission other than the Central
Authority is preserved. The second point is the convention contains
9. Article 3 of the Statute provides that Ordinary Sessions shall, in principle, be
held every four years. [1964] 2 U.S.T. 2228, T.I.A.S. No. 5710, 220 U.N.T.S. 121.
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1696, 1781 (1970).
I1. S. Exa-c. Doc. C, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1967).
12. [1969] 1 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.
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certain substantive provisions having a due process character. Article 15
prohibits default judgment in cases when service is undertaken pur-
suant to the convention, in the absence of proof that service was made
in time to enable the defendant to defend. However, a Contracting
State may reserve the right to allow the Court entry of judgment in the
absence of proof of service, if six months have elapsed since the date
of transmission and all reasonable efforts have been made to obtain
proof of service.
Article 16 requires reopening of a default judgment at the instance
of a defendant who can establish that, without fault on his part, he
did not have notice in sufficient time to defend or knowledge of the
judgment in sufficient time to appeal and that he has a prima facie
defense on the merits. Any Contracting State can place a time limit on
this right of the defendant but not less than one year from date of
judgment.
This convention entered in force, with the United States as an original
party, on February 10, 1969. There are now eleven States party to the
convention.13 Two years of operation under the convention offer too
short a span to determine how it is working out in practice, but thus
far we have not heard of any serious problems.
The other draft conventions considered at the 1964 Conference were
concerned with adoption and contractual provisions on choice of
courts. Neither convention as worked out at the conference appeared
particularly attractive to us. This would appear to be the general view
as no State has ratified the choice of court convention 14 and only one
State the adoption treaty.' 5
One other subject was under active consideration at the 1964 Con-
ference-recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This ex-
ceptionally difficult subject has had an exceptionally confused career.
The hesitation of States regarding a multilateral convention for en-
forcing foreign judgments led to a decision in 1964 to use a hybrid
form in which a general convention on recognition would become ap-
plicable between the individual States party to it only on the basis of
13. Belgium, Barbados, Botswana, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States. Five additional States have
signed but not yet ratified the Convention: Germany, Greece, Israel, Netherlands and
Turkey.
14. Convention on the Choice of Court of November 25, 1965, CONFERENCE DE
LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVk, RECUEIL DES CONVENTIONS [hereinafter cited as
REC. DES CONVENTIONS] 96 (1970); 13 Amr. J. Corp. L. 629 (1964>; IV INT'L LEG. MAT.
348 (1965) (English text).
15. Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Recognition of Decrees Re-
lating to Adoptions of November 15, 1965, REC. DES CONVENTIONS 64 (1970); 13 Am.
J. COMlp. L. 615 (1964); IV INT'L LEG. MAT. 338 (1965) (English text).
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bilateral agreements between those States. The consequence of this
decision was to inject into an already complicated problem the ad-
ditional question of how far two States could depart in the bilateral
agreements from the requirements laid down in the parent multilateral.
An Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference was held in April
1966 to draft the judgments convention. This session produced a draft
treaty' 6 that has many merits. It deals with most of the problems that
plague recognition-including time of enforceability, due process re-
quirements, fraudulent judgments, extent of review by the enforcing
court, counterclaims and exclusivity of jurisdiction. The problem ol
jurisdiction is approached by laying down seven bases for the exercise
of jurisdiction by the court issuing the judgment. If one of these bases
is present the court requested to enforce the judgment cannot reject
the request on a jurisdictional ground.
The provisions regarding the bilateral agreements to implement the
basic convention give wide latitude for variance. Article 23 lists twenty-
three permissible deviations that may be included in bilateral agree-
ments. This cafeteria approach to the bilaterals posits the obvious
query-why bother with the multilateral at all if it can be so widely
varied. The answer is that many of these variations represent prob-
lems peculiar to one or two countries and that the multilateral would,
in operation, ensure a substantial degree of uniformity in enforcement
of judgments practice.
A greater problem with the convention lay elsewhere-in a dispute
over the likelihood of discrimination under a proposed Common Mar-
ket convention on judgments. 17 The situation is too complicated to
describe in the time available except to say that courts in Common
Market States would be barred from enforcing certain types of foreign
judgments against Common Market residents. These States would be
permitted to enforce such judgments against nonresidents of the Com-
mon Market even though these persons resided in States which had
become parties to the Hague convention. The result was discrimination
of the first class, second class-citizen type. The dispute resulted in a
second meeting which produced a protocol to the judgments conven-
tion.' s The protocol seeks to eliminate the possibility of discrimination
16. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters of February 1, 1971, REc. DES CONVENTIONS 106 (1970); 15
Am. J. CoMP. L. 362 (1966/1967); V INT'L LEG. MAT. 636 (1966 (English text).
17. 2 CCH COMMON MKT. REP. 6003.
18. Supplementary Protocol of February 1, 1971, to the Hague Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
REC. DES CONVENTIONS 124; 15 A~m. J. ComP. L. 369 (1966/67); VI INT'L LEG. MAT.
1083 (1967) (English text).
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by prohibiting Contracting States from enforcing a foreign judgment
if the jurisdictional basis in the original action is based only on one or
more of six specified grounds. Among the six grounds are jurisdiction
based on the nationality of the plaintiff and service of process on a
plaintiff during temporary presence in the State.
The value of this protocol diminished greatly when a number of
Common Market States indicated they considered they could ratify the
basic convention without the protocol. At the 1968 Hague Conference,
renewed efforts to paper over the differences took the form of declara-
tions in the Final Act of that meeting that everyone intended to be
good.19 Our inclination is to wait and see what other States do before
we decide on any positive action regarding the convention. In the mean-
time we are studying the desirability of negotiating straight bilateral
agreements on recognition and enforcement.
Among the subjects that the Advisory Committee on Private Inter-
national Law directed its attention to, once we got through the initial
flood of business, was the U.N. arbitral awards convention.20 The
American Bar Association had urged United States accession to the con-
vention.21 After a thorough review we reached the conclusion that the
adverse factors that had troubled our delegation to the conference
were, in the main, not substantial obstacles. There would be a series of
operational problems in aligning the convention with the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925.22 For example, we would have to separate
arbitration in interstate commerce from arbitration in foreign com-
merce and provide for the enforcement in United States courts of agree-
ments to arbitrate at places outside the United States. But all the
problems seemed superable by carefully designed implementing legis-
lation. Consequently the Advisory Committee recommended that the
convention go up to the Hill.
The President submitted the convention to the Senate on April 24,
1968.23 The Senate gave advice and consent to ratification on October
4, 1968, on the understanding that ratification would be postponed until
19. A fuller treatment of the discussion at the Eleventh Session on the relationship
between the Judgments Convention and the Supplementary Protocol and the possible
complications which might arise if and when the Common Market Convention enters
into force appears in the Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Ses-
sion of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, VIII INT'L LEG. MAT.
785, 820-822 (1969).
20. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
of June 10, 1958, [1970] T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
21. The resolution recommending accession that the House of Delegates of the
Association adopted on September 1, 1960, is printed in S. Exac. Doc. E, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 27 (1968y.
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
23. S. EXEC. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968).
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enactment of the enabling legislation.24
When we began considering the final form of the legislation we en-
countered a splendid assortment of problems we had not focused on,
such as venue provisions and whether the jurisdictional amount should
be retained or eliminated in removal actions. We came up with a rela-
tively short Chapter 2 to be added to Title 9 of the U.S. Code, the
basic approach of which was to ensure that the U.S. District Courts
would enforce agreements to arbitrate foreign trade transactions and
enforce awards arising out of such transactions. It was enacted with-
out any noticeable opposition and signed by the President on July
31, 1970.25 The United States deposited its instrument of accession to the
convention on September 30, 1970-the thirty-seventh country to do so.
It is now possible to enforce in the District Courts of the United
States agreements in writing to arbitrate a dispute arising in the foreign
commerce of the United States except an agreement between two U.S.
citizens that does not have a reasonable relation with one or more
foreign States.26
Arbitral awards which meet the same foreign commerce require-
ment will be recognized and enforced by the District Courts, subject to
the provisions of the convention 27 which specify that certain defenses
such as invalidity of the contract, lack of proper notice, and ultra
vires award may be raised. In addition, a defendant may remove any
case involving such an arbitration agreement or award brought in a state
court to a Federal District Court.28
The general opinion in the foreign trade community is that the
accession of the United States to the U.N. arbitration convention is a
significant step forward.
Our initial experiences in the sales conference and the 1964 Hague
Conference had underscored the desirability of having experts from
the United States on the expert groups that prepare draft conventions
for the full-scale conferences. The 1968 Hague Conference scheduled
three topics for consideration: taking evidence abroad, recognition of
divorce judgments, and conflict of laws applicable to traffic accidents.
The first of these topics, taking evidence abroad, was put on the
agenda as a result of a U.S. initiative. We prepared a memorandum
proposing a treaty in this area that was circulated to all members
of the Hague Conference in 1967. The response was favorable and a
24. S. ExEc. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1968).
25, Pub. L. No. 91-368, § 4, 84 Stat. 692 (1970).
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (1970).
27. Article V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, [1970] T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
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special commission was appointed to prepare a draft treaty. Philip W.
Amram, the moving spirit behind this operation, went to the special
commission meeting in June 1968 carrying a draft that had been
hammered out in one of our working groups. The special commission
accepted the basic features of the United States draft, made some re-
visions, and sent the text to the Hague Conference for consideration
at the October 1968 meeting.
The speed of this operation is unprecedented in the private law field.
The momentum continued through the October meeting, which
adopted a final text29 containing all of the innovations and improve-
ments that the United States had proposed originally.
Our basic approach was to introduce much greater flexibility in the
means available to obtain evidence abroad and to make it possible
for the requesting court to obtain evidence in the form best suited
for use under its own legal system. For example, a French court may
want evidence from the United States in the form of a judicial sum-
mary of a witness' testimony while an American court might want a
verbatim transcript of a hearing in France with counsel doing the bulk
of the questioning rather than a judicial officer.
As in the service of documents convention, the internal primary
mechanism under the convention is a Central Authority in each Con-
tracting State to which letters of request for obtaining evidence may be
sent directly by any judicial authority in another Contracting State.3 0
The Central Authority is obliged to ensure the request is fulfilled
expeditiously.31
The convention lays down fairly detailed requirements as to the
content of letters of request. 32 An interesting aspect on language is that
a Contracting State is required to accept a letter in either English or
French unless it has made known that it will not accept letters in either
or both of those languages but only in its own language.33 The letter
may specify that a special method or procedure be followed in taking
the evidence, and the judicial authority executing the letter must
comply unless this is incompatible with the internal law of the State
of execution or is impossible of performance by reason of its internal
practice and procedure or by reason of practical difficulties.34 This,
coupled with provisions to ensure that the parties requesting the evi-
29. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
of March 18, 1970, REc. DES CONVENTIONS 152 (1970); 16 ANI. J. Co-f p. L. 5 (1968);
VIII INT'L LEG. MAT. 37 (1969) (English text).
30. Id., Art. 2.
31. Id., Art. 9, para. 3.
32. Id., Art. 3.
33. Id., Art. 4.
34. Id., Art. 9, para. 2.
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dence and their representatives may be present when the request is
executed,35 will go far to produce evidence in the form best suited to
the needs of the requesting court. With regard to recalcitrant wit-
nesses, provision is made for the executing court to employ the same
"appropriate measures of compulsion" as it would in internal cases.30
The convention preserves all existing diplomatic and consular chan-
nels for obtaining evidence from abroad and clarifies their use in cer-
tain respects. An innovation is the formal recognition in a multilateral
treaty negotiated by civil law and common law representatives of the
use of commissioners in taking evidence abroad subject to general
or specific approval of the foreign State concerned.
In summing up the convention in the American Bar Association
Journal,37 Philip W. Amram remarks that "it makes no major changes
in United States procedure and requires no major changes in United
States legislation or rules. On the other front, it will give United States
courts and litigants abroad enormous aid by providing an international
agreement for the taking of testimony, the absence of which has created
barriers to our courts and litigants."
This view is concurred in by all those who have studied the con-
vention. We are hoping to submit it to the Senate for advice and con-
sent to ratification within the next few months.
We had also participated actively in the work of the special com-
mission that formulated the proposed convention on the recognition of
divorces and legal separations. The patent major issue any such con-
vention raises is the basis for jurisdiction and, in particular, the con-
flict between the common law thesis of domicile or habitual residence
as the preordained source of authority and the civil law concept that
nationality should be the determining factor. The chasm between the
two systems was bridged by accepting both concepts subject to a variety
of protective limitations. Article 2 of the convention 3s as accepted by
the Conference requires recognition of divorces and legal separations
if the defendant habitually resided in the State granting the divorce
on the date proceedings were instituted.
If the habitual residence of the plaintiff is relied on, then he must
have habitually resided in the State for at least a year immediately prior
to the institution of proceedings, or the last habitual residence of both
35. Id., Art. 7.
36. Id., Art. 10.
37. Amranm, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55
A.BA.J. 651, 655 (1969).
38. Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations of June 1,
1970, REc. DES CONVENTIONS 142 (1970%; 16 Am. J. Cotp. L. 582 (1968) and VIII
INT' LEG. MAT. 31 (1969) (English text).
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spouses must have been in that State.39
Nationality is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction if both spouses are
nationals of the granting State or the plaintiff has his habitual residence
therein or, a slightly complicated formula, had had his habitual resi-
dence there for a continuous period of one year, any part of which
falls within the two years preceding the institution of proceedings. 40
This last proviso was a final concession to the last-ditch adherents of
nationality. Article 3 equates domicile for the purposes of the conven-
tion to habitual residence but excludes domicile based on dependehcy
of the wife.41 This blow for freedom was achieved without any repre-
sentative of Women's Lib being present at the Conference.
The requirement of recognition is reinforced by Article 6 in two
respects. First, if the defendant has appeared in the proceedings, the
findings of fact on which jurisdiction is based are binding. Second,
recognition cannot be refused because the internal law of the State
in which recognition is sought would not allow divorce upon the same
facts. Finally, there cannot be a re-examination of the merits of the
decision except as required in the application of other provisions of
the convention.
United States participation in the preliminary work and in the
Conference was influenced by the special considerations resulting from
the application of the full faith and credit clause in our federal sys-
tem. For a recognition convention to be acceptable to us we thought
it essential to achieve recognition of divorce decrees that must be
accorded full faith and credit under the Constitution. The crunch
point was the Sherrer-type divorce42 in which, as you recall, the Supreme
Court held a Florida Court decision on jurisdiction was not subject
to collateral attack in Massachusetts by a defendant who had ap-
peared in the action in Florida. Inasmuch as the proceedings in that
instance were filed three months after the plaintiff had moved from
Massachusetts to Florida and the spouses had not habitually resided
together in Florida, the Sherrer-type divorce would not have met the
requirements for recognition under Article 2 (2) of the convention.
However, if non-unified legal systems such as that of the United
States had the benefit of the nationality principle in Article 2(3),
the Sherrer-type divorce would be covered by the convention.
Since acceptance of the nationality principle was an essential element
39. Id., Art. 2, para. 2.
40. Id., Art. 2, paras. 3 and 4.
41. See DicaY's CONFLICT OF LAWS 113-15 (J.H.C. Morris gen. ed. 1967) for a dis-
cussion of the English rule that a married woman cannot acquire a domicile of her
own. The English rule is not followed in the United States. Id., 113 n. 99.
42. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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of the convention, our delegation decided to put it to work for us.
We proposed a new article applicable to States having varying legal
systems in different territorial units. The major result would be to
ensure recognition by other parties to the convention of a divorce
granted, for example, within the United States when the husband
and wife are both U.S. nationals on the same basis as divorces granted
to nationals in a State having a unified legal system. In other words
the place of habitual residence within the United States of the two
U.S. nationals would not be a matter of concern to the foreign court
asked to recognize the divorce decree if the nationality test had been
satisfied. We urged the adoption of this article on the ground that
nationality was indivisible. Apparently this struck a responsive note
because, despite earlier indications of opposition to "Reno" divorces, 43
the amendment was accepted.44
Some foreign courts have refused to recognize Sherrer-type divorces
on such grounds as fraud on the court. The divorce convention thus
offers us a special plus in addition to a salutary general house-cleaning
in a rather muddled legal area. But it does raise sharply the question of
federal-state relations. The convention is being carefully studied by the
other governments concerned, and we are following the same course. 45
Consideration by the Conference of the third subject - traffic accidents
- had not appealed to us at the time it was suggested and became steadily
less appealing as it developed. In general, our position was that con-
flict rules applicable to traffic accidents were in a state of flux and any
codification exercise should be postponed until some settling down had
taken place. Our worst fears were justified when the Conference came
out with a choice of law test based on the State of registration of the
motor vehicle.46 Perhaps the only thing in the exercise that became
clear to us was that this selection had been largely affected by European
insurance interests. The Advisory Committee has decided that we want
no part of the exercise.
The Hague Conference has two major items scheduled for its 1972
meeting-choice of law in products liability and the international ad-
43. Cf. Bellet & Goldman, Rapport Explicatif, CONFfRENcE nE LA HAYE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL Paavk, II AcTEs E- DOCUMENTS DE LA ONZIP--ME SESSION, DIVORCE, para. 56
(1970) [hereinafter cited as AcrFs II].
44. ACrEs II 186 (there designated Article 13 bis; the provision became Article 14,
paragraph 1, of the Convention>.
45. As of April 1, 1971, only the United Kingdom had signed. A number of other
States have more recently indicated that they expect to sign the Convention within
the next few years.
46. Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents of May 4, 1971, REC.
DES CONVENTIONS 142 (1970); 16 Ams. J. Comp. L. 589 (1968); VIII INT'L LEG. MAT.
34 (1969) (English text).
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ministration of movables in the estates of deceased persons. Willis Reese
will fill you in on the first; the second is at too early a stage of develop-
ment to permit discussion.
The cyclical nature of the Hague Conference with its fixed quadrennial
sessions guarantees a turnover of subject matter. The Rome Institute
follows a policy of developing a draft uniform law and then seeking a
State that will host an international conference to consider its adoption.
The absence of the cyclical pressure for productivity that is built into
the Hague system together with the considerably greater obstacles to
the unification of substantive law than to procedural or choice-of-law
rules results in a much slower rate of development in the latter organi-
zation. A number of the Rome projects in which we are now actively
participating have been on the ways for a fair number of years and are
not yet seaworthy. These include additional aspects of international
sales-draft conventions on the substantive validity of contracts of inter-
national sale and on agency law in the field of international trade. One
UNIDROIT project to be considered at a diplomatic conference was
the convention on travel contracts. 47 The objective of the convention
is to regulate the form and content of the contracts entered into between
travel agents and travelers, lay down rules to govern such ancillary mat-
ters as cancellations and refunds, and, the knottiest problem, provide
rules regarding the liability of the travel agent to the traveler for loss
or damage suffered in the course of the trip and provide a limitation of
liability.
We had participated in the experts group that had produced the draft
convention and were seriously concerned about its provisions on liability.
The most controversial issue in the draft48 considered by the conference
was a provision that a travel agent who organized a trip, defined to
include all packaged travel arrangements, undertook absolute liability
for the acts of third parties who performed services or provided accom-
modations. The theory was that this sweeping responsibility would be
coupled with a fairly low limit of liability. We considered this approach
unsound and pressed, both in the experts group and at the conference,
to make the travel organizer liable for nonperformance of the contract
as well as for loss or damage sustained by the traveler in those cases
in which the travel organizer or persons under his control carried out
the service. Our proposal also made the travel organizer liable for the
nonperformance or improper performance of the contract by third
parties in cases in which the travel agent failed to exercise due diligence
in their selection.
47. International Convention on Travel Contracts (CCV), done at Brussels, April
23, 1970. IX INTL LEG. MAT. 699 (1970).
48. [1967-1968] 1 Y.B. INT'L INST. UNIF. P~av. L. (UNIDROIT) 189 (1969).
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 5, No. 1
The issue was sharply disputed in the conference, and a wide variety
of proposals on liability were advanced. At one stage every proposal had
been voted down. The final result was a convention with low limits
of liability, $16,500 for personal injuries, $660 for property loss, and
$1,600 for any other type of damage or loss, and a confusing compromise
on scope of liability. Our delegation reported that it appeared the travel
agent is held liable for the failure of third parties to perform the services
requested, such liability being limited, however, to the rules governing
these services. For example, should a hotel fail to honor a reservation,
the traveler can seek redress against the agent who organized the travel,
who will then be liable in the same manner as the hotel would have been
liable if the action had been brought against the hotel under the laws
of the country in which the hotel was situated.49 Where the hotel pro-
ceeds to furnish the services but is negligent and such negligence results
in the injury of the traveler on the premises, the travel agent will be
liable only if it is shown that he failed to exercise due diligence in the
choice of the hotel.
The convention will require a good deal of study to determine what
its effects in relation to existing law will be and whether some obvious
deficiencies, among which the low limits of liability are especially notice-
able, are outweighed by the advantages of some degree of international
regularization in an area that has been badly affected from time to time
in various parts of the world by loose practices.
There is another Rome Institute draft which we find promising-
the draft convention for a uniform law on the form of wills.50 The pur-
pose of the convention would be to establish an international form of
will that "shall be valid as regards form, irrespective of the place where
it is made and irrespective of the nationality, domicile, or residence of
the testator, if it is made in the form of an international will complying
with the provisions set out hereafter." 51
This draft convention has been circulated quite widely among States
and the proposal has received substantial support. A considerable num-
ber of suggestions for improvement have been made and a working
group, in which we will participate, is to meet in Rome to revise the
draft in light of the comments received. The major problem for the
United States arises from the fact that in many countries the common
practice is for a will to be deposited with the notary who supervises the
49. Report of the United States Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on the
Travel Contract 9-10 (1970) (unpublished materials on file at the Dep't of State.
50. For the Draft Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of Wills
together with significant extracts from the Rome Institute's Explanatory Report
(1966), see 2 INT'L LAW. 251, 257 (1968>.
51. Draft Uniform Law on Wills, Art. I, para. 1. Id. at 255.
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execution. This practice has been embodied in the uniform law as a
requirement to ensure the validity of the will. The will must be left
in the custody of the qualified person supervising execution and if
withdrawn from that custody the will ceases to be valid as an interna-
tional will. We do not really have any official with functions parallel to
the civil law notary, who supervises the making of the will as a
part of the judicial system and retains it in the same capacity. There is
also the fact that a substantial percentage of testators in the United
States prefer to keep wills in their own custody rather than leave them
with trust companies or attorneys. In our comments we suggested that
there was no real equivalent for the Continental practice available in
the American system and that an option such as having an approved will-
custodian retain a completely-identified photocopy might be allowed.52
We are reasonably confident that a satisfactory solution can be reached
because the international will concept is conceived as an option avail-
able to people with property holdings in more than one country who
wish to simplify and reduce the cost of probate procedures. The intent
is not to change the formal requirements of any national legal system
regarding the validity of a will but to construct an optional standard that
will meet the most strict formal requirement. It is a highest-common-
denominator approach. This gives more room for adjustments than would
be available if we were seeking a compromise solution among the vary-
ing national systems.
Given what seems a geometric progression in the mobility of people,
the need for probate of wills in a number of States is certain to increase
dramatically. This international form of will convention is a modest but
quite useful contribution to reducing legal complexities in these cases
and we will cooperate fully in seeking to produce a widely-acceptable
convention.
At approximately the midpoint of the seven-year period which we
are surveying, a new organization, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), held its first session in New
York. Established by General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) of De-
cember 20, 1966, the Commission is actively engaged in the unification
and harmonization of the private law of international trade. The United
States is among the twenty-nine members of the Commission. As you will
have a fairly full-dress review of what is happening in that forum at lunch
and this afternoon, there is no need to make more than one com-
52. The Committee of Governmental Experts on the Form of Wills which met
in Rome from May 3 to 8, 1971, deleted Article 12 of the 1966 draft uniform law
which required that the will be left in the custody of the qualified person who'
received it. The Committee decided that the question of the deposit and custody
should be governed by local law.
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ment. When UNCITRAL was established and during the initial years
of operation, there was a good deal of skepticism as to its ultimate
utility. That is now disappearing. It is still too early for any definitive
proof of accomplishment such as a generally accepted convention in
the international trade field to have appeared; nor can this be anti-
cipitated for several more years.53 But the work in UNCITRAL is moving
forward and may well turn out to be the principal instrument for the
development of world-wide private law.
In all of these enterprises we have received an enormous amount of
cooperation and assistance from members of the bench and bar in the
United States. Without assistance of this character, the United States
would not have been able to participate with any real degree of effec-
tiveness in these private law activities. The Ford Foundation has played
an indispensable part by making funds available to the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for such essentials
as independent research and assembling private experts to help hammer
out the positions to be taken by the United States in international
conferences.
You now have a somewhat sketchy record of the first seven years of
United States participation in the unification of private law. Whether
they have been seven fat years or seven thin years I leave to your verdict.
All I can say is that whatever may be the measure of these first seven
years, we will try to make the record of the next seven years a fuller
measure.
53. UNCITRAL recently requested its Working Group on Time-Limits and Limi-
tations (Prescription) to prepare a final draft of a Uniform Law on Prescription for
submission at the 1972 session. U.N. Comm'n. on Int'l Trade L., Report, 26 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 9, para. 118, U.N. Doc A/8417 (1971). A number of delegates ex-
pressed the hope that the Commission might be in a position to transmit an ap-
proved draft convention on the subject to the General Assembly by 1973.
